Jinnah and The Leaders of Punjab. (1935-1947)

According to Jinnah, Punjab was the cornerstone of Pakistan. The Unionist Party's rule and Khzir Hayat Tiwana played a key role in the increase of Muslim League's influence in the Punjab from 1942-47. Jinnah had some clashes with the leaders of Punjab. Khzir Hayat Tiwana had a different mandate with his own vision of a United Punjab within a decentralized federal India. In 1944, Khizr frequently clashed with Jinnah.

Khizr Hayat's role in 1947 raises a number of questions for the Muslims of Continent. What cultural and political constraints lay behind his much-flaunted cry of 'Punjab for the Punjabis?' Why did he not display the traditional Tiwana buccaneering and accommodate himself to the Muslim league advance?

Khizr was undoubtedly influenced by his times, his education and his social upbringing. He has opened up the possibility of political power and influence. Land ownership held the key to power in Punjab and Tiwana held the most land in its western regions. Punjab's communal confirmation also decreed that only a Muslim could hold office as premier. That is why it was Khizr, not Chhotu Ram who succeeded Sikander.

Khizr assumed that partition would split the stuff of Punjabi society and extinguish a whole way of life. He observed the Muslim League's demand as based on the hatred of the Non- Muslim. He maintained that there was nothing in the Quran that made the creation of Pakistan a sacred act. On the contrary, the demand of the partition was profoundly Un-Islamic in the true sense of words of Khizer's personal distaste for Jinnah arose from what he saw as the latter's hypocrisy in using religion for his own political interests, when he possessed only a fundamental knowledge of Islam himself and did not practice it in a sacramental wisdom.

Khizer's supplement to political lodging was inverted in the agitated days of the end of empire. But this approach remains highly noteworthy for the present-day Indian subcontinent which has perceived a recurrence of communal hatred and violence.

In cross Communal Punjab Unionist Party was dominated. In 1923 Hindu and Muslims founded it. Khizr Hayat was its last leader. The political characteristic of Khizer was his loyalty to the Raj. He relieved nationalist politician as manipulators who were out of touch with the 'real India'. His out looked was rooted in is family history. By the end of his career, such loyalty neither was nor reciprocated. Throughout 1945-46, he depended on heavily on the advice of the British Governor Sir Bertrand Glancy. An honest and highly upright man himself, Khizr never considered that the British might recklessness their Unionist allies. He was shocked by Wavell's 'capitulation' to Jinnah at the time of the 1945 Simla Conference and later believed that Attlee had deliberately deluded him concerning British intentions regarding the timing of the British withdrawal. It may have been wishful thinking, but he had hoped for the smack of firm government, not miserable surrender with the following chaos of partition. Khizr typically did not; however allow a sense of infidelity to spoil his friendship with former officials. Khizr's loyalism was not based on self- interest, but rather on the belief that the imperial connection ensured the Punjab's progress. After the 1946 provincial elections, he brought together the feuding Congress and Akali parties in a final unsuccessful attempt to shore up Punjab's communal harmony. In short, he was a realistic practitioner of consociation democracy.

From October 1937 onwards, Sikander had exacted a high price for his upholding Jinnah at the center. This was nothing less than the complete subordination of the Muslim League within Punjab. A pact had been concluded between Sikander and Jinnah at the historic Lucknow session. It's conflicting interpretation later caused much trouble between Khizr and Jinnah. In the 1930s, the Unionists, however, held all the cards. Jinnah, therefore, did not challenge their views at the same time as Muslim unionists could join the Muslim League; this was not to affect the continuation of the existing coalition ministry in Punjab. This would still be called the unionist party. In return of Punjabi Muslims, much needed support in Indian politics; Jinnah consented in an essential take-over of the province of Muslim League by Sikander and his supports.

Jinnah and Khizr Hayat Tiwana relations troubled had been disinfecting between the unionist party and the Muslim League ever since the Delhi Council session of March 1943. It had put Khizr on an audition to begin a dynamic Muslim League assembly party even if it jeopardized the running of his ministry. The storm finally broke in April 1944. Jinnah and Khizr resonated at each other through the columns of the press following the collapse of their consultations. The conflict became so intense that Punjab premier was unprecedently disqualified from the AIML.

The suppositions appeared to stalk from an outwardly in offensive disagreement over the detail of the pact which Jinnah had signed with Khizr's successor, Sikander in 1937. The Muslim League grouped was established under its own terms, in Punjab assembly, should in future adopt the Muslim League tag with the result that the government should be named the Muslim League alliance ministry instead of Unionist ministry.

In 1943, the Governor of Punjab warned that 'the main threat to our political tranquility comes from Jinnah and the Muslim League.' The Muslim League's view was the religious community was the basic source of political identity. The Unionist party, however, viewed communal cooperation. Contradiction over Sikander-Jinnah Pact became inevitable. The stakes were so high for Khizr. He was personally committed to the Unionist vision. He knew that anxiety about the imperial war effort and awarded the consequences of the Muslim League rocking the boat in the sword of arms of India. British already shared these worries. The Viceroy Lord Wavell noted to Glancy in 1944, 'the dissolution of the Unionist Ministry and the substitution of a Muslim league ministry such as Jinnah wants will be a disaster. I very much hope that Khizr will look at the matter from this point of view and rally the Unionists.' Lord Wavell and Mountbatten found Khizr personally charming more than Jinnah's personality.

The beliefs and up bring of Khizr were crucial at this point. He has a lack of political ambition; cross-communal family relationships all inclined him towards a 'foolhardy' course of opposing Jinnah. Jinnah ordered to his Secretary that every member of the Muslim League Party in Punjab assembly should declare that he owes his allegiance solely to the Muslim League in the Assembly and not to the Unionist party or any other party, whilst Punjab premier refused to renounce the Unionist party name. Jinnah declared Khizr that he was a 'madman' and you will regret this rest of your life.

The Punjab Muslim League, between the years 1943-1947, developed as the actual figure of the Muslims of Punjab. The Punjab Muslim League was supported from under and its strength simply demoted the Unionist Party, urban elite, rural landed aristocracy, Pirs and eroded their social bases.

The diplomacy, the tactics, leadership, and planning of M. A. Jinnah provided strength and motivation to Punjab Provincial Muslim League and the Muslims of Punjab and guided them towards the goal of Pakistan. The political climate of the Muslim Punjab and its association with the diplomacy and politics of Jinnah, it elevated Jinnah to the position of an icon.

The Imperialist and Cambridge historians, Marxist and Nationalist historians of India and even the nationalist historians of Pakistan are of the opinion that Jinnah and Punjab Muslim League at first organized the strong support of the urban elite, rural landed aristocracy, Pirs, and Sajjada-Nashins who subsequently won over the Muslims of Punjab for the cause of the Muslim League and Pakistan. It has been suggested by these scholars that the demand of Pakistan in the Muslim Punjab was based on the vertical mobilization and it was not a mass movement. It has been further arguing by these scholars that the Muslims of the Punjab entered the ranks of the Muslim League either because of total factional rivalries or the changes brought about by the Second World War but not to support the popular demand of Pakistan.

The historians and researchers like Penderel Moon, Peter Hardy, David Page, Anita Inder Singh, Ayesha Jalal, Stanley Wolpert, Hector Bolitho, Ian B. Wells and Ajeet Jawed gave views that Jinnah as such a leader who followed cross political agenda. However, the Shamsul Hasan Collection exposes such an opinion about Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam, particularly in standings of his part in the politics of Punjab. These documents propose that Jinnah and leaders of the Punjab Muslim League were dealing with matters like culture, society, religion, economy, finance, industry, scientific development, press, education and the position of women, thus, adding meaning to the Muslim Nationalism.

Penderel Moon, Peter Hardy, Hector Bolitho, Stanley Wolpert, Ayesha Jalal and Asim Roy have all depicted that Jinnah as a shrewd bargainer of the high politics of the partition of India. These scholars have projected Jinnah as a leader with aristocratic and taciturn personality who always moved and interacted within the elite corridors and sometimes would avoid even trembling hands with the people, especially with the common man. Jinnah has been anticipated by these scholars such a masterful leader who would always marshal his powers while tightening his hold on the sword arm of his primary nation Pakistan. He has been viewed as claiming sole spokesman of the All India Muslim League who was always worried to strife his customary prattle of tongues. These historians have perceived Jinnah as an obstinate, self-interested, and ambitious politician and far-sighted statesman who was always concerned with his personal political achievements and victories and was less concern with the real interests and ambitions of the Muslim masses.