The
elections in Britain in July 1945 brought the Labour party into power. Congress
circles expected quick action from the new government, but the Labour's desire
to settle the Indian problem did not necessarily mean that they were in any
hurry to end the empire. It did, however, accept the recommendation of a
Governor's Conference held in Delhi on 1-2 August that elections to the
provincial and central legislatures should be held in the coming winter: the
Governors agreed unanimously that an official government could not solve
post-war problems.
On 21
August Wavell announced that the elections would take place. What gave the
elections immense significance was Attlee's statement in Parliament on 11
September; that the 'broad definition of British policy contained in the
Declaration of 1942. . . stands in all its fullness and purpose'. Wavell would
undertake discussions with new representatives in the provincial legislatures
to ascertain whether it was acceptable or whether some alternative or modified
scheme would be preferable. Their election would be followed by positive steps
to set up a constituent assembly that would frame a new constitution.
Obviously, the imminence of the British departure was clear to all parties and
sections of public opinion, though the British government had not fixed a date
for it, or even declared it to be an immediate aim of policy.
If the
Cripps offer stood as the basis of British policy, it meant that the right of
provinces to opt-out of an Indian Union stood with it. For Jinnah, it was
necessary, if he had any hope of achieving a sovereign Pakistan, to get a
majority in the legislatures in the Muslim majority provinces. Wavell knew that
Jinnah attached 'more importance to the number of seats the League can win both
in the Central Assembly and in the Provincial Assemblies than to the ability of
the League to form Ministries in the Muslim majority provinces.' The League
must also win the support of the Muslim masses, especially in the Punjab and
Bengal, where a plebiscite might eventually be necessary to decide the case for
Pakistan. Thus, the 'immediate and paramount issues' before Jinnah were
Pakistan and to make good the League's claim to represent the Muslims of India.
Jinnah's
task was not easy. The League organization in most places was poor; the leaders
were mostly men of some social standing and did not bother themselves with mass
contacts and local committees. Mamdot, for example, had not allowed mass
contact committees on his estate. In the NWFP, the League was divided and
lacked funds. Aurangzeb stood discredited because of the corrupt methods he had
used to retain himself in power. In Sind, the provincial League was riven by
factions. In Bengal, the tussle between Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy culminated in
the former not being given the League ticket for the elections.
Nevertheless,
Jinnah appears to have been able to assert his authority over the provincial
Leagues. The Central Parliamentary Board of the League had the final say in the
selection of candidates for the provincial and central legislatures. In Sind,
G.M. Syed's group was not given any tickets, which stirred them to put up their
own candidates against Jinnah's in every constituency. [Statesman 3, 5 and 9
January 1946 and 1 February 1946. That the majority of Syed's candidates were
defeated was a personal triumph for Jinnah.] Jinnah got his way in Punjab as
well. The provincial League was divided; and most provincial Leaguers did not
want Firoz Khan Noon, who had resigned from the Viceroy's executive in October
to contest the elections in Punjab, to stand as the League's candidate for
Rawalpindi. They regarded him as an outsider and were afraid that he would take
the credit for the League's success in Punjab. That he was nevertheless
allowed to contest from Rawalpindi at Jinnah's bidding points to the increasing
authority Jinnah had come to exercise over the provincial League since the
break with Khizar in June 1944.
That the
AIML was able for the first time to have the final say in the selection of
candidates suggest that it was expanding its own organization instead of
relying entirely on provincial Muslim Leagues or parties; and that it also had
its own provincial machinery. In Punjab, for example, the League's
Committee of Action had started propaganda to popularize the party even before
Khizar's expulsion from it. Permanent paid workers were employed to carry out
propaganda in the rural area and a center was set up in Lahore to train
volunteers and to employ members of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation
during their vacations. The Committee of Action moved its office to Lahore in
May 1944 and Liaqat Ali Khan, then General Secretary of the League, supervised
the organization of propaganda, which included preaching in mosques. The stake
the AIML had in the province is illustrated by the fact that it donated half
the money for the party's activities in Punjab; the rest was raised by the
provincial League. It was when Jinnah had his own machinery in the provinces,
that "Pakistan" was popularized. It could be used to brand provincial
Muslim politicians who were lukewarm or opposed to it as traitors to Islam, and
it could suggest that the League was the only party offering a guarantee of
political security and opportunity at the all-India level; where decisions on
the political future of India would be taken.
In the
Punjab, the brunt of the League's attack was directed against the Unionists.
The party had ruled the province since 1920, and had successfully countered the
influence of both the Congress and the Muslim League. It was not easy for the
League to fight through the maze of power and influence that the Unionists had
built up over the last twenty odd years. Writing in Dawn on 2 September, a
League sympathizers observed that panchayat officers in most cases were nominees
or relatives of Unionist MLAs. The Unionists represented the Jagirdars,
honorary magistrates and government grantees. Therefore, the bureaucracy and
aristocracy were dependent on each other, and their influence over the peasants
had been demonstrated in the elections of 1937. The success of the League would
not come
'By working
in the top strata of the Punjab Muslims alone . . . the League should work from
the bottom upwards. The villager must be contracted (sic) by mass propaganda.
. . the Congress was successful in the U.P. not because it won over the
landlords but . . . because it made the peasantry class conscious.'
It was in
this tactic that the cry of Pakistan could be made most effective. Punjab
League's election manifesto was believed to have been drawn up by G. Adhikari,
a Communist leader, and touched up by Jinnah.[FR for Punjab for the second half of
November 1944, HP file no. 18/11/44 and Civil and Military Gazette, 8 November
1944]. In December 1944, Muslim Leaguers in the province were being told to
associate with Communists to draw on their supporters.[FR for Punjab for first
half of December 1944, HP file no. 18/12/44]. Since 1944, the Communists
themselves had decided to infiltrate the Congress, League, and the Akalis and
were working among the Muslim masses with "Pakistan" as their slogan,
which may be taken as an indication of its popular appeal. The Communist
contribution to the League's victory in the elections cannot yet be ascertained
from the material available. Not that their part in drawing up the League's
manifesto implies any significant Communist or radical influence within the
League. Landlords were the largest single group within the provincial and all
India Leagues, though a struggle between them and more radical elements may have
been taking place in the party. But if the manifesto was drawn up by them with
Jinnah's knowledge, it shows the lengths to which he was prepared to go to win
the majority of Muslim votes in Punjab and to out the Unionists.
The
Unionists-and their British supporters-were attacked on any pretext which
presented itself. The Unionist decision not to contest any seat for the Central
Assembly gave rise to the League's argument that if the central elections were
beyond their scope of work; their demand for a seat in the Viceroy's executive
was also not within their sphere of action. Dawn editorialized about
'The
disreputable caucus knew as the Unionist Ministry of Punjab. That
reactionary junta who has long fattened on the ignorance of the Punjab masses
and traded on the latter's dread of the bureaucracy. . . Most shamefully
servile of all Indian Ministries, the Khizar Cabinet had learned to depend upon
the support of permanent officials through whom it bestowed patronage for its
own nefarious political and personal ends.'
Wavell's favorable
reference to the Unionists even induced Jinnah to proclaim: 'When we fight for
Pakistan we are fighting against the British and not against the Hindus.'
Muslim League alleged official interference in favor of the Unionists and the
provincial League passed a resolution demanding the dismissal of the ministry
and the 'liquidation' of bureaucratic machinery. Glancy declined a demand by
the provincial League to issue a communiqué assuring voters that the provincial
election would be entirely free from official interference. This only
intensified attacks on the Unionists and the British by the Muslim League.
Evidence of
official interference and pressure comes from both League and British sources.
Campaigning in Mamdot's constituency, a League worker asked Jinnah for one lakh
rupees from the League's central fund as official pressure was 'too much'. The
British Deputy Commissioner in Attock wrote to his parents that Khizar was
sympathetic to his application for leave.
'Actually, certain interested parties-which I think includes the premier-want
me to get out of Attock as I am not prepared to swing the Elections for the
Unionist Party (which is the party in power).'
Again, the
Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur reported that 'nearly 80 percent' of the
subordinate Muslim staff, both revenue and District Board had active League
sympathies and a large number of them had been used as instruments by the
League for submitting false and forged applications of Muslim League voters.
Official interference in spite of Government instructions regarding neutrality
in the matter 'is largely on the side of the League rather than the Unionist
Party.' As it turned out, the League achieved its greatest victories in
constituencies where it had made the strongest allegations of official
interference. Earlier, Glancy expressed the view that the Unionists suffered
'at least as much' as any other party from the activities of officials who were
not impartial.
The
defection of 30 Muslim Unionists to the League since 1944 made the League's
task easier, but it did not imply a walkover for the League in the provincial
elections. The ex-Unionists included Daultana, Mamdot, and Ghazanfar Ali, all
big landlords. At the beginning of October 1945, Major Mumtaz Tiwana, the biggest
Tiwana landowner and one of the pillars of the Tiwana tribe, joined the League.
He was followed by Firoz Khan Noon, who resigned from the Viceroy's Council to
work for the League and to counter the influence of Khizar, who was his cousin.
Families were divided-would Muslims vote for Khizar or Mumtaz? And who would
win when two candidates of great social and religious influence were pitted
against each other-for example, Mustafa Shah Jilani and his Unionist opponent,
Makhdum Murid Husain Qureshi? The Qureshi's claimed descent from the Muslim
saint Bahauddin, the hereditary guardian of the shrines of Bahauddin, who was
said to have descended lineally from Hasham, the grandfather of the Prophet.
One of his brothers was a Sajjad[Sajjda] Nashin; Murid Husain himself was
President of the Zamindara League. The Jilani's came from Jilan in Persia, had
enjoyed a grant of Rs. 12, 5000 from the Mughals, and were regarded as one of
the most influential families in Multan. Mamdot was opposed by Mohammed Ghulam
Sarwar, who belonged to an important landowning family of Ferozepur district,
and was also a Pir. The influence of Daultana in Multan was offset by Major
Ashiq Husain, regarded by his followers as a hereditary saint.
With many
men of influence pitted as candidates against each other, social influence
could not have been the decisive factor in the League's win in Punjab in
1946. It may have counted where a candidate of influence was set up against one
with less influence or a political unknown. But it must also be remembered that Punjab was not a province of many big landlords-most of the landed classes
in the province comprised of small peasant proprietors. It was to them the
League had addressed its appeal since November 1944. But it was not before
November 1945 that the provincial League set up branches in tehsils. The
League's entry into the villages, then, occurred at a very late stage; only
three months before the polling for the provincial elections took place in the
Punjab.
Even so,
the organization of the League was very much better than that of the Unionists.
The calm in the Unionist headquarters in Lahore was explained by the secretary
of the Unionist Party thus:
'We are a
rural party. . . . We do not believe in public meetings. . . . Our men go to
villages and talk to local notables who wield influence over voters. They
explain to them the work we have done and the benefits our legislation has
conferred on peasants. Villagers, we know, will follow them.'
His remarks accounted for the difference in the propaganda technique of the two
parties. The League held forty to fifty meetings a day all over the province.
The Unionist Party's average was 'not even one a day'. Almost a statement a day
was issued from the League office in Lahore, criticizing the government or
explaining their stand on one thing to another. Ghazanfar Ali used to preside
over a daily round table conference with a European cartoonist and a number of
journalists working for the League.
It was in the countryside that the issue was to be decided, for only 12 of the
85 Muslim seats were allotted to the urban areas. The game was tough; at the
beginning of February 1946, the League and the Unionists were reportedly
running neck and neck in the villages. In some constituencies, a voter was
alleged to be richer by almost half a year's income if he pledged his vote. It
was estimated that over 15 crores had changed hands during the elections, which
were certainly not a poor man's show. In some constituencies, they cost 7 to 10
lakhs of rupees. There were cases of whole villages pledging themselves to the
highest bidder.[Civil and Military Gazette, 8 February 1946]. Paper, petrol, and
transport played an exceptionally important part in the Punjab elections, and
prices of buses soared. Most of the 100 trucks ordered by the League in
December 1945 was used in Punjab to cart their potential voters from
distant villages to polling booths. The Statesman commented that the success or
failure of a candidate could depend on the ability to provide transport. 'This
is particularly true of rural areas where the promise of a joyride is the entire
price one needs pay for a voter.'
Students,
politicians and Ulema carried out religious propaganda for the League.
Politicians would often preach in mosques after the Friday prayers. Students
had earlier campaigned against Unionists who had cooperated with the National Defense
Council in 1941. Aligarh Muslim University started a special election training
camp for students in August 1945, and more than one thousand students worked
for the League in the Punjab and Sind alone. Student leaders were in constant
touch with Jinnah. Their youthful idealism may have made them more reliable
than some party politicians as propagandists for the League. Ali Ahmad Faziel,
a League worker writing in Dawn was especially keen that college students be
trained as party workers in different areas. The League would provide at least
one trained worker for every 1000 voters; therefore at least 800 chief workers
would have to be trained, and every constituency was to have 'at least' 12 such
workers. A minimum of six of these workers should belong to the constituency in
which they would campaign for the League and in addition an equal number of
outside workers. The headquarters of the constituency would act as the link
between the provincial committees and individual field workers. They would be
assisted in everyday affairs by the League's National Guard. Muslim League
newspapers put students in the 'vanguard' of the League's election campaign in Punjab. Daultana declared that in many districts in the Multan division,
student workers had been able to turn the tide in favor of the League.
Now that
the League was expanding its organization into the countryside, it was able to
exploit the religious appeal of Pakistan effectively, and its propaganda was
based on the identification of Pakistan with Islam. For example, Firoz Khan
Noon openly preached that a vote cast for the League was a vote in favor of
the Prophet. [Glancy to Wavell, 27 December 1945, L/P&J/5/248]. Omar Ali
Siddiqi, leader of the Aligarh Election Delegation to Punjab declared that
'the battle of the Karbala is going to be fought again in this land of the five
rivers.' A poster issued in Urdu over the signature of Raja Khair Mehdi Khan,
the League candidate in Jhelum district, asked Muslims to choose between 'Din'
and 'Dunya'; in the 'battle of righteousness and falsehood.'
Din Dunya
On one side
is your belief in On the other side you are
the
Almighty and your con- offered squares and jagirs
science
Righteousness
and faithful- The other side has to offer
are on
one side Lambardaris and Zaildaris
One side is
the rightful On the other side is Sufedposhi
cause
One side
has Pakistan for The other has Kufristan
you (reign
of infidels)
On the one
side is the prob- As opposed to this there is
lem of
saving Muslims from only consideration of per-
slavery of
Hindus sonal prestige of one man
On one side
you have to On the other is Baldev
bring
together all those who Singh and Khizar Hyat
recide the
Kalima(the basis
of Islam)
On the one
side is the con- On the other side is the
sideration
of the unity and Danda(big stick) of
brotherhood
of all Muslims bureaucracy and terror of
officialdom
One the one
side are the lov- On the other are the admir-
ers of
Muslim League and ers of Congress and Union-
Pakistan
ists
On the one
side is the hon- On the other is the Gover-
our of the
Green Banner ment of Khizar Ministry
...for the
sake of your religion, you have now to decide in the light of your strength of
faith, to vote for ..'[Translation enclosed in Glancy to Wavell, 28 February
1946, L/P&J/5/249, italics of non-English words by author]
Ulema from
UP, Punjab, Bengal and Sind and local Pirs threatened Muslims with ex-communication
which included a refusal to allow their dead to be buried in Muslim graveyards
and a threat to debar them from joining in mass Muslim prayers, if they did not
vote for the League. Those who opposed the League were denounced as infidels,
and copies of the Holy Quran were carried around 'as an emblem peculiar to the
Muslim league.'
The religious appeal of Pakistan was admitted by Khizar when he declared that
the Unionists were for Pakistan; that Muslim would be voting for Pakistan
whether they voted for a Muslim League candidate or a Muslim Unionist. The
banner flown on the election camps of the Unionists and League were an
identical green, bearing the Muslim legend of the Crescent. Khizar was on the
defensive and lacked conviction in adding that inter-communal cooperation was
necessary in Punjab. The Unionists argued that the crucial electoral issue for
voters was not Pakistan, to which the Unionists were already committed; the
choice was
'between
chaos, disorder and communal bitterness on the one side, which is the only
prospect held out by the Muslim League group, and a stable and efficient
administration offered by the Unionists in the interests of the masses to which
the majority of the Muslims of the province belong.'
The election manifesto of the Unionist Party stressed the economic achievements
of the ministry including the reduction of the agriculturist debt by two crores
of rupees. Provincial autonomy, complete independence, free and compulsory
primary education for the poor, a reduction in military expenditure was the
party's aims. But the economic achievements of the Unionists seem to have had
little influence on the Punjabi Muslim voter in 1946.
That
Khizar's Pakistan, implying intercommunal cooperation, was rejected so
decisively by the Muslim voter points to the success of the communal propaganda
of the League and to the appeal of a communal Pakistan for Muslims. But though
the cry for Pakistan had now become the most successful means of politicizing
the Muslim masses, it is by no means clear what they understood by it.
Statements by the Punjab Leaguers based precisely on Jinnah's definition of
Pakistan as a sovereign state[See, for example, Jinnah's reply to Patel in
Statesman, 19 November 1945] are hard to find, as are statements opposed to it
or even a discussion on Pakistan as a part of a federation. To most Leaguers in
1945-6, Pakistan appears to have stood for some sort of general salvation from
Hindu domination and symbolized and [sic] Islamic revival in India.
What
counted most in the League's victory in the Punjab in 1945-6? The great effort
is made; the fact that for the first time the League's organization had reached
down to contact the Muslim voter, partly accounted for its win. The appeal was
essentially religious and attempted to convince Muslims of the benefits of
Pakistan. Propagandists were directed when they visited a village to: 'Find out
its social problems and difficulties to tell them [the villagers] that the main
cause of their problems was the Unionists [and] give them the
solution-Pakistan'. Soldiers were told that the Unionists had not done anything
for them after the war. For the students who campaigned for the League,
Pakistan held out the promise of the resurgence of Islam-'our aim is
essentially to reorient Islam in the modern world, purge our ranks of the
reactionary Muslim Church and to free ourselves from economic and political
bondage'.[Translation of pamphlet issued by the election board of the Punjab
Muslim Students Federation, quoted by Talbot, 'The 1946 Punjab Elections'.
Modern Asian Studies, 14, 1, 1980, p. 75]. These seemed a far cry from the assurance given by Jinnah to the Pir of Manki Sharif in November 1945 that
Pakistan would be based on the laws of the Quran in which Shariat would be
established,[Sayeed, Pakistan:The formative Phase, p. 208] but it showed that
Pakistan could mean, as it was intended to mean, all things to all men.
S.E.Abbott, then Secretary to Khizar, attributed the League's victory to the
Muslim belief in the inevitability of Pakistan. The League had presented the
elections as a plebiscite for Pakistan. The claim had not been contradicted by
the British, who would actually transfer or confer power. To that extent, their
silence on the subject also contributed to the League's victory.
In Bengal,
the League's influence in urban areas had been rising since its coalition with
Huq in 1937. After provincial Leaguers fell out with Huq in 1941, they had
organized demonstrations against him in several towns of the province. The
popularity of the League in urban Bengal was evident by 1944 when Huq's Muslim
candidates lost every seat in the elections to the Calcutta Corporation to the
League. Radical Leaguers like Suhrawardy built up a base among Muslim labor
during the League's tenure in power from 1943-5. Involved in ministerial
politicking, Huq had gradually lost the rural base which had swept him into
power in 1937. In 1946, Bengal League candidates were personally selected by Suhrawardy
and approved of by Jinnah. "Pakistan" as Bengal Leaguers presented it
to their voters lead to prosperity for backward Muslims. At a Bengal League
conference, Liaqat Ali Khan promised the abolition of zamindari without
compensation-a promise which could have only won the League support of the poor
Muslim peasantry of Bengal. But were Bengal Leaguers, thinking of the sovereign
Pakistan of Jinnah's conception? It seems unlikely. Ispahani, one of Jinnah's
most loyal lieutenants in Bengal, told the Governor in January 1946 that
Muslims needed opportunities for self-advancement, administratively and
otherwise, and Casey's 'definite impression' was that adequate safeguards would
be acceptable to the Muslims. Ispahani said he realized very well that the day
of small states was passed, and that if the British imposed an interim government
of India, which had adequate safeguards for the Muslims, it would be accepted.
The League's success in Bengal and Sind can be partly accounted for by the fact
that it did not face any serious, organized opposition in these provinces.
Huq's party was in disarray; in Sind, no Muslim stood on the Congress ticket as
this would have been fatal for any chances of victory. Congress lacked the
money and organization required to contest Muslim seats in every province. The
release of Congress prisoners less than three months before the elections added
to their difficulties and large amounts of money were needed in the Muslim
majority provinces, especially in the Punjab and Bengal, which, for the
Congress, 'held the key position' in the election. But it was in these two
provinces that the provincial Congress groups were riven by factions, and
organizational work never really got underway. [Azad to Patel, 21 October
1945, Patel to Prafulla Ghosh, 26 October 1945.]
Congress
strategy in Muslim constituencies sometimes confounded its own supporters. For
example, in Sind the Congress negotiated with the League for a coalition, even
as it was fighting the League in other provinces. Azad's offer to the League of
a coalition in Sind 'came as a great surprise' to Congressmen in Punjab.
Anti-League Muslims 'cannot understand these things, nor can the rest of
us'.[B.S.Gilani to Patel, 10 February 1946] The Congress allied with
Nationalist Muslims, Ahrars, Momin's-indeed with any anti-League Muslim party.
It carried out propaganda for Nationalist Muslims, and the League and the
Congress vied with each other in the virulence of their appeals to religious
loyalty. The Congress used Muslim divines in the UP and Bengal. League
ministries during the war were condemned as the stronghold of the British. In
Bengal, Nationalist Muslims alleged that one of the 'wonders' of the League
ministry during the war was the 'man-made famine' of 1943. To this the League
reported that Hindus, who were in a majority in the Viceroy's executive
council, had refused to send food to Bengal and were therefore responsible for
the famine. League newspapers published reports of Hindu volunteers donning
Turkish caps while campaigning for Nationalist Muslims.
The League,
however, had the whip-hand in Muslim religious propaganda against the Congress.
The Morning News in Calcutta claimed that the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Hind, which
campaigned for the Congress was working for Hindiat, while the Jammat-i-Islami,
which supported the League, stood for Islamiat.[Morning News, 25 October 1945].
The Jammat-i-Islami accused the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Hind of making a distinction
between religious and secular matters.
'They remembered the prayer, but they forgot the chain of armor donned by the
Prophet Muhammed when he went forth to fight the unequal battle with the
infidels... They misled the Muslims to the unworthy tenets of ahimsa.'
Its
attempts to outdo the League in religious propaganda, without having a
widespread popular base among Muslims profited Congress little, and only
contributed to the atmosphere of communal bitterness.
Only in the NWFP was the Congress successful in both Hindu and Muslim
constituencies. Here, in spite of defection from the Congress to the League
before the elections, the Congress was the better-organized party. Aurangzeb
stood discredited because of the undignified method he had used to remain in
power and was not even given a League ticket. Although the Congress and their
Red Shirt allies used the religious appeal(the tri-color was marked with the
Kalima), it was not this alone that won the election for the Congress. The
Congress was successful in representing the League as a catspaw of the British.
It appealed to the less well-to-do, over whom the Khans were losing their hold.
Moreover, the provincial League was disorganized, and it was only on 10
December that a Committee of Action was set up. The fact that Mamdot was
appointed as its convener suggests that the League found it difficult to get a
reliable man from the province to head the committee.
All candidates in the NWFP attached importance to personal contacts with voters
and visited individual houses or mohallas. Election officials reported a
growing sense of political discipline in canvassing, addressing and organizing
mass meetings. Appeals to tribal and sectional loyalties were made, but they
may not have made much difference in a province where a Khan only had to
declare his loyalty to the League, and his relatives would support the
Congress. They would also give their tenants a free-running, and it was 'a
tenantry which had been primed that they would be allowed to take over the land
belonging to the Khan if the Congress came to power'. The election saw a fight
more on ideological than on personal grounds. The League's charge that the
Congress was using office to win votes was balanced by the fact that most
Muslim officials had League sympathies, and even some British officers and
their wives campaigned for the League. Pakistan did not have much appeal for
the Pathans, because, according to Cunningham, they did not think they would be
dominated by the Hindus or anyone else!
Nevertheless,
the League did not fare so badly in the province, contesting all 33 Muslim
seats and winning 15. It also won the special seats reserved for landholders,
none of which was contested by the Congress. The Congress won 19 Muslim seats
and lost 8. Anti-League parties secured 58.75 percent of the total Muslim
vote. The extent of the League's success in Muslim constituencies in 1945-6 can
be gauged from the fact that it won 76 percent of the total Muslim vote in
India- a very far cry indeed from the 4.8 percent it had obtained in 1937! Its
achievements in Punjab were remarkable; it defeated and unseated 57
Unionists in Muhammedan rural constituencies; the Congress in 9 rural
constituencies and swept the Ahrars from 5 urban seats. The Unionists defeated
the League in only 11 rural constituencies. With a total of 62 wins in rural
areas, all 9 urban seats, and both the women's seats, the League chalked up 73
seats in the Punjab legislature, and polled 65.10 percent of the votes polled
in Muslim constituencies.
In Bengal,
it did even better, obtaining 83.6 percent of the Muslim votes polled. The
Krishak Praja party secured only 5.3 percent, and the Jamiat-ul-ulema and
Nationalist Muslims, both supported by the Congress, won 1.2 and 0.2 percent
of the Muslim votes polled.
The NWFP
was the only province where the League failed to secure a majority of Muslim
votes: anti-League parties obtained more than 58 percent of the votes polled.
Nevertheless, of the extent of the League's victory, and its appeal to Muslims,
there was no doubt. The gains of the League clearly represented a turning of
many Muslims from the essentially provincial concerns to rally behind the only
Muslim party which would take care of their interests at the all-India level,
in the bargaining for the spoils of the transfer of power. The League's success
also represented a solidification and politicization of the Muslim religious
community, a rallying to "Pakistan", but whether that meant the
victory of Jinnah's conception of a sovereign state can perhaps is questioned.
With the election results out, there arose the question of the formation of
governments in the provinces. In Bengal and Sind, the League had enough seats
to form ministries, but in Punjab, it needed the support of 10 more members
to obtain a majority in the legislature. Here the League offered 3 portfolios
to the Sikhs if they would enter a Muslim League coalition.[Statesman, 26
February 1946] But Pakistan was the stumbling-block. The Sikhs objected to the
League's insistence on Pakistan, to which the Muslim League leaders replies
that the ministry came under the Act of 1935 and that all India issues did not
come into question. The Sikhs retorted that there was no all India issue for
them.[Civil and Military Gazette, 28 February 1946]. Negotiations between the
League and the Congress failed because the League refused to enter into a
coalition with any non-League Muslim groups.[Statesman, 6 and 9 March 1946].
This was in contrast to the years before 1945 when the AIML had not always
been able to prevent provincial Leagues from coalescing with non-League Muslim
parties. Jinnah's authority was now apparently sufficient to prevent such
coalitions. Every candidate for the elections had been selected with his
approval; their victory was, therefore, a personal triumph for him.
On 7 March, the Congress, Akalis, and the Unionists formed the Punjab Coalition
Party, under the leadership of Khizar. The strength of the Coalition worked out
to at least 10 more than that of the League. Glancy accordingly called on
Khizar as leader of the coalition to form a ministry, despite the contention of
Muslim League leaders that represented the largest individual party.
Deprived of
constitutional power, the League organized demonstrations against the Ministry.
Muslim students were directed by provincial League leaders to demonstrate
before Khizar's residence in Lahore. The communal feeling had been strengthened by
an election fought on the slogan of Pakistan, and the Congress leaders advised
Hindu students not to start counter-demonstrations; while the League demanded
Glancy's dismissal. Local Muslim Leaguers were directed 'to organize the Muslim
masses to prepare them for the determined will of the Mussalmans and a blot on
the fair name of this Province'. The Congress was condemned for joining the
coalition whom it had formerly derided as reactionaries. A coalition which
included so small a percentage of Muslims was a strange anomaly in the
Province, especially when the party which commanded a majority of the Muslim votes
found no place in the government. It did not augur well for the future.
